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Abstract
A Þrm may decide to have some of its customers sign exclusive con-
tracts in order to deprive a rival of the minimum viable size, exclude
it from the market, and enjoy increased market power. If contracts
are required to be simple enough, this strategy may induce ineﬃ-
cient exclusion even if the excluded Þrm is present at the contracting
stage. Exclusive contracts may thus cause ineﬃcient eviction, not only
entry-deterrence, even though the former is less likely than the latter.
However, complex enough contracts, if feasible, would allow agents to
reach a Pareto-optimum, without ineﬃcient exclusion.
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Jullien, Zvika Neeman, Debraj Ray, Patrick Rey, Daniel Rubinfeld, Jean Tirole and
Thibaud Vergé for their comments on an earlier draft.
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1 Introduction
This paper aims to clarify the circumstances under which a Þrm may
sign exclusive contracts with some of its customers in order to exclude a rival,
even though exclusion reduces social welfare. This clariÞcation is important
both for its own sake and from the viewpoint of antitrust policy. Indeed, the
legal treatment of exclusive dealing appears to be responsive to the twists
and turns of economic theory. For example, the so-called Chicago critique,
which purported to prove that the reasonings underpinning the traditional
hostility toward exclusive dealing were ßawed, seems to have induced U.S.
Courts to progressively soften their handling of exclusivity clauses.1
From a theoretical viewpoint, the need for clariÞcation stems from the
fact that, while the recent body of literature rigorously described several sce-
narios of welfare-reducing exclusion through the use of exclusive contracts, it
still leaves readers wondering which conditions exactly are necessary for these
anticompetitive outcomes to occur in equilibrium. The main contribution of
this paper is to show that, although the existing theories of socially harmful
foreclosure through exclusive contracts assume that some of the adversely af-
fected parties are not present during the contracting stage, this assumption
is unnecessary. Such an outcome can also occur when all aﬀected parties are
present, as long as contracts are required to be simple enough. This theoret-
ical result is relevant for antitrust policy, because most of the relevant case
1See Wiley (1998) and Gilbert (2000) for a survey of the legal treatment of exclusive
contracts and an economic discussion.
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law involves situations in which the allegedly excluded Þrms were initially in
the market and thus perfectly able to respond to the disputed contracts with
counteroﬀers of their own.
1.1 Relation to the literature
The Þrst analysis of exclusive contracts emanated from the Chicago school
and dismissed the view that these contracts could be used by a Þrm in order to
exclude a rival and increase its market power. The Chicago school argument
is simply that if such exclusion is socially ineﬃcient, the payment which
the excluding Þrm has to grant consumers in order to "bribe" them into
agreeing to exclusivity would exceed the incumbent Þrms gain from deterring
entry or inducing exit2 Exclusive dealing must them have other, probably
procompetitive motives.3
The "post-Chicago" literature has identiÞed several circumstances under
which socially harmful exclusive contracts may arise.
Matthewson andWinter (1987), for example, showed that a manufacturer
may proÞtably use impose exclusivity to a local retailer in order to foreclose
a rival in a local market, and that this outcome may be (but need not be)
socially harmful.4 But this result breaks down if nonlinear pricing is feasible5.
2See Posner, (1976, p. 212) and Bork (1978, p. 309). For a generalized and rigorous
version of the Chicago critique, see Bernheim and Whinston (1998, hereinafter "BW"),
especially Section III; and OBrien and Shaﬀer (1997).
3See, e.g., Marvel (1982) and Segal and Whinson (2000b).
4See also Comanor and Frech (1985) for a related analysis.
5See the discussion in BW and OBrien and Shaﬀer (1997). However, Spector (2007)
shows that Mathewson and Winters (1987) result may still hold under nonlinear pricing
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On the other hand, various papers have shown that exclusivity clauses
may facilitate proÞtable entry deterrence or competitors eviction. Their
common theme is that ineﬃcient exclusion may occur when some adversely
aﬀected parties (a potential entrant, or future consumers) are absent at the
contracting stage, and thus cannot make the payments to other parties which
are necessary for Coasian bargaining to take place and lead to eﬃciency.
The seminal paper in this branch of the literature is Rasmusen et al.
(1991, henceforth, RRW), complemented by Segal and Whinston (2000a,
henceforth SW) - these papers are the ones most closely related to ours.
They show that, if increasing returns make a minimum scale of operation
necessary for proÞtable entry, an incumbent can achieve full exclusion cheaply
by exploiting the lack of buyers coordination, or by discriminating between
buyers. The idea is that even if buyers as a whole lose when entry is deterred,
entry deterrence can be proÞtable because the excluding Þrm does not need
to bribe all its potential customers into signing an exclusivity agreement. It
only needs to have some of them sign exclusive contracts, just enough to
deprive the potential entrant from the minimum viable scale. The incumbent
can then fully exploit its market power vis-à-vis all the potential customers,
including those who did not sign an exclusive contract and whose consent
was not bought. The entrants need for a minimum scale of operation thus
generates a contracting externality across customers which the incumbent
if the seller does not know each customers demand function. This is simply a consequence
of the more general fact that nonlinear pricing together with asymmetric information
resembles linear pricing.
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can exploit6. In this case, the Chicago critique breaks down because the
excluding Þrm does not need to compensate the loss suﬀered by all buyers,
but only that suﬀered by some of them. A coordination failure among buyers
may lead to the same result.7 Variants of RRW consider the possibility of
buyers forming coalitions8 or the impact of competition among buyers9. But
all of them stick to the assumption that the potential entrant does not take
part to the contracting game.
A related idea can be found in models assuming that some adversely
aﬀected parties, other than the excluded Þrm, cannot take part in the con-
tracting game. These parties can be consumers in a future market10, or agents
whom transaction costs deter from participating to the contracting game11.
In yet one more category of papers, socially harmful exclusion may result
from contracts signed between wholesalers and retailers because Þnal con-
sumers are left aside12.
All these models assume that some adversely aﬀected parties are absent
from the contracting game. This raises two issues. The Þrst one is theoret-
6For a systematic treatment of contracting with externalities, see Segal (1999, 2003)
and Segal and Whinston (2003).
7SW stresses that the equilibria in which exclusion is achieved by exploiting the lack
of coordination among buyers are not perfectly coalition-proof.
8Innes and Sexton (1994).
9Motta and Fumagalli (2006), and Simpson and Wickelgren (2004, 2005).
10BW, section IV
11Gans and King (2002).
12Hart and Tirole (1990); Lin (1990); OBrien and Shaﬀer, (1993). Simpson and Wick-
elgren (2004) belongs to this set of papers (since the presence of downstream consumers
exacerbates the ineﬃciency) while at the same time being a variant of RRW (since the
excluded Þrm in their model is a potential entrant unable to participate to the contracting
game).
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ical. In most of the aforementioned models, contracts are restricted to take
a rather simple form. For example, RRW and SW only consider simple ex-
clusive contracts, ruling out both breach penalty provisions and conditional
contracts.13 A natural question emerges then: is the possibility of socially
harmful eviction driven by the absence of some adversely aﬀected parties
during the contracting game, or by the restrictions imposed on the nature
of feasible contracts? Clearly, if these two assumptions were lifted, i.e., if all
aﬀected parties could enter into very complex contracts, unhindered Coasian
bargaining would induce an eﬃcient outcome. But what is the respective
importance of each of these two assumptions?
This question brings us to the second issue. The aforementioned literature
is at odds with the facts of much of the relevant case law, which deals with
settings where the excluded Þrm(s), or other potentially harmed parties,
could in principle have responded to the alleged exclusionary strategy. This
point has been made by Whinston (2001, pp. 68-69) in his discussion of
the US v Microsoft case, and by Rasmusen et al. (2004), who noticed that
their theory failed to apply to the landmark Lorain Journal case, because
the alleged victim was already present in the market when the disputed
exclusivity clauses were oﬀered. The same remark applies to several recent
13Aghion and Bolton (1987) is an exception. They show that ineﬃcient exclusion may
occur if the incumbent can oﬀer exclusive contract together with a breach penalty provi-
sion. But this result is driven by uncertainty about the potential entrants costs, which
causes the incumbent to exclude a more eﬃcient entrant "by mistake", as a result of poorly
calculated breach penalties. Also, a section of SW considers breach penalties, but under
very speciÞc assumptions.
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nonlinear pricing cases in which the disputed schemes were close to exclusivity
requirements, like the European Michelin II case.14
1.2 This papers contribution
This paper attempts to precisely identify the factors which may cause ineﬃ-
cient exclusion to occur, and in particular to disentangle between two possible
factors, namely limits on the nature of contracts and limits on which agents
may oﬀer contracts. Section 2 presents a very general, reduced-form model,
of which RRW, SW, and BW are subcases. It is Þrst applied to the familiar
incumbent-entrant case (Section 3), with the following results.
 Ineﬃcient entry deterrence may occur even when discriminatory oﬀers
are prohibited, even without any coordination failure among buyers.
A necessary condition for this is that Þrms proÞts in a no-exclusion
equilibrium be strictly positive (Proposition 1).
 Ineﬃcient entry deterrence is even more likely to occur when discrim-
inatory oﬀers are possible. This is proved in Proposition 2, of which
the results in RRW and SW are special cases.
 The possibility to include breach penalty provisions in exclusive con-
tracts decreases the likelihood of ineﬃcient entry deterrence, but does
not eliminate it (Proposition 3).
14European Commission Decision 2002/405/EC, Michelin, 2002 O.J. (L 143).
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 The combination of breach penalty provisions and conditional oﬀers is
enough to make ineﬃcient entry deterrence impossible (Proposition 4).
The paper then considers the two-incumbent case, in which the potential
excluder and the potentially excluded Þrm are on an equal footing as regards
the possibility of making oﬀers (Section 4). The results are as follows.
 There always exists a perfect coalition-proof equilibrium without exclu-
sion, and there exists no equilibrium with exclusion if discrimination is
prohibited (Proposition 5), or if exclusive contracts can include breach
penalty provisions (Proposition 7).
 A perfect coalition-proof equilibrium with ineﬃcient eviction may exist
alongside a no-exclusion one if simple, discriminatory exclusive con-
tracts can be oﬀered, without breach penalty provisions. But the ex-
istence of an exclusionary equilibrium is in general less likely than in
the entrant-incumbent case (Proposition 6). We view this result as
the most important one of this paper, because it means that exclusive
contracts can induce ineﬃcient eviction and not only entry deterrence.
Even more strikingly, one of the implications of Proposition 6 is that
under the special assumptions of RRW and SW, exclusion is as likely
to occur in the two-incumbent case as in the incumbent-entrant case.
These results are summarized in Table 2, in Section 5.
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2 The model
The assumptions of the model are kept as simple as possible for the sake
of tractability. There are two Þrms, labeled Firm 1 and Firm 2, and two
consumers (a and b). Firms cost structures are diﬀerent, while consumers
have identical preferences.15
In order to conduct the analysis at a general enough level, we specify re-
duced forms rather than detailed preferences and technologies. More speciÞ-
cally, we assume that the institutional context is as follows.
During the Þrst phase (which may be subdivided into diﬀerent periods),
consumers and Þrms can enter into contracts, which may involve lump-sum
transfers, a commitment by a Þrm to serve a consumer, possibly an exclusivity
requirement, as well as, possibly, other characteristics. Which Þrms can oﬀer
contracts (depending on whether the situation considered is an incumbent-
entrant one, or a two-incumbent one), which type of contract can be oﬀered,
whether discrimination is allowed, the timing of moves, is described in greater
detail below. Diﬀerent assumptions correspond to diﬀerent "contractual en-
vironments", which this paper compares. At the end of this Þrst period,
some lump-sum transfers have been made, some Þrms are committed to deal
with some consumers, and some consumers are committed not to deal with
some Þrms.
15The assumption that consumers have identical preferences is made in RRW as well.
RRW also assumes that Þrms are identical (except for the fact that one is incumbent),
but SW relaxes this assumption when discussing breach penalties (in Section IV).
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During the second phase, subject to the constraints induced by the con-
tracts which have been signed (i.e. an obligation to deal or a prohibition from
dealing), Þrms and consumers deal with each other, which results into payoﬀs
for the various parties. How these payoﬀs are determined is not the point of
this paper. They may result from bargaining, or from Þrms, or consumers,
making take-it-or-leave-it oﬀers, involving linear or nonlinear pricing, etc.
For our purposes, there is no need to enter into these details, because the
only relevant variables are, for each possible situation, the proÞt accruing to
each Þrm, and each consumers surplus.
Finally, the list of Þrm-consumer deals actually consummated (as per
second phase decisions, themselves constrained by Þrst phase outcomes) and
the Þrst phase lump-sum transfers together determine each Þrms proÞt and
each consumers surplus level.
2.1 Consumer preferences
Consumers are assumed to have identical preferences, given by Table 1 be-
low.16
Table 1: consumer preferences
16The magnitudes V and Ui in Table 1 are indirect utility levels. They are equal to the
utility levels achieved by a consumer dealing with either Þrm (or with both), given the
nature of the strategic interaction between Þrms and consumers, left outside of the model.
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Situation Consumers utility
A consumer is served by both Þrms V
A consumer is served by Firm i only Ui
2.2 Firm proÞts
Firm 1s proÞt is equal to λπ1 + µbπ1 where λ and µ are, respectively, the
number of consumers served by both Þrms and the number of consumers
served by Firm 1 only. It is assumed that bπ1 > π1 in order to capture
the idea that Firm 1s proÞt is greater in monopoly than in duopoly. The
assumption that Firm 1s per customer proÞt only depends on the degree of
competition for that customer is consistent with the assumption that Firm
1s technology displays constant returns to scale.
Firm 2s technology is assumed to be characterized by economies of scale
in the following sense. If Firm 2 serves both consumers, then its proÞt is
equal to λπ2+µbπ2 where λ and µ are, respectively, the number of consumers
served by both Þrms and the number of consumers served by Firm 2 only
(with, obviously, λ+µ = 2, and bπ2 > π2). However, if Firm 2 serves a single
consumer, its proÞt is equal to bs2 (if it is alone in serving that consumer)
or s2 (if that consumer is also served by Firm 1), with bs2 > s2 (in order
to account for the fact that Firm 2s proÞt is greater under monopoly than
under duopoly).
The following assumptions about parameters are made throughout the
paper for i=1 and i = 2:
11
πi ≥ 0 (1)
V > Ui (2)
V + π1 + π2 > Ui + bπi (3)
s2 < bs2 < 0 (4)
These assumptions have the following interpretation. (1) implies that
competition leads to nonnegative proÞts for both Þrms if each has unre-
stricted access to both consumers. (2) and (3) imply that consumer as well
as aggregate welfare is greater under competition than under monopoly. Fi-
nally, (4) means that because of economies of scale, Firm 2 is better oﬀ serv-
ing no consumer at all than serving only one of them, even as a monopolistic
supplier. This assumption is central to all our results: it implies that if Firm
1 succeeds in signing an exclusive contract with one consumer, then Firm 2 is
better oﬀ not serving any of the two consumers, because serving only one of
them would not allow it to recover its Þxed costs. This assumption is indeed
central to the results in RRW, SW, and BW.
All the assumptions above are satisÞed in RRW.17, but our model is far
17The correspondence is as follows.In RRW, π1 = π2 = 0 (since both Þrms duopoly
proÞts are zero), V=CS(c), U1 = U2=CS(pm), and bπ1=bπ2 = (pm − c)q(pm). RRWs
assumption stated as "π < x∗" is equivalent to (3), since it means that aggregate welfare
is greatest when both Þrms serve consumers. Finally, the assumption that the entrant
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more general. For example, it allows for the possibility that both Þrms sell
diﬀerentiated goods as well as for nonlinear pricing.
3 Foreclosing an entrant through exclusive
contracts
In this section, we deal with the situation analyzed in RRW and SW, i.e. that
of an incumbent able to oﬀer exclusive contracts. We start by assuming that
the incumbent is only able to oﬀer simple exclusive contracts (i.e. without
any breach possibility), and we examine two alternative cases, depending on
the incumbents ability to discriminate across consumers. Our results in the
case where discrimination is allowed coincide with those of SW. We then turn
to more complex contracts.
3.1 Simple exclusive contracts without discrimination
In accordance with RRW and the related literature, we start by considering
the following simple game.
makes losses when serving a single consumer is equivalent to the identity N∗=1 in RRW.
There is however a diﬀerence between RRW and this paper. In RRW, both Þrms have
identical costs, but the assumption that the incumbent would make losses if it served
only a small number of customers is irrelevant because of its Þrst-mover advantage. In
this paper, because Þrms are on equal terms regarding the timing of oﬀers, we need to
depart from the assumption of identical costs for simplicity, in order to limit the number
of equilibria. In this sense, Þrms are not on equal terms as regards costs. But the point
of this paper is simply to investigate the consequences of them being in equal terms as
regards contracts, not costs.
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Stage 1. Firm 1 may oﬀer each consumer a contract specifying that (i)
the consumer commits not to purchase from Firm 2; and (ii) a lump-sum
transfer from Firm 1 to the consumer. Firm 1 cannot discriminate among
consumers: a contract oﬀered to one consumer must be available to the other
one.
Stage 2. Consumers simultaneously decide whether to sign the contracts
possibly oﬀered to them in Stage 1. The lump-sum payments corresponding
to the contracts which end up being signed are made.
Stage 3. Observing the outcome of Stage 2, Firm 2 decides which con-
sumers it wants to serve. It cannot decide to serve a consumer who signed
an exclusive contract in Stage 2. However a Þrm can serve a consumer with
which it signed no contract at the previous stage. Each consumers welfare
level and each Þrms proÞt is then determined according to Table 1, depend-
ing Firm 2s choices. Lump-sum payments provided in exclusive contracts
signed in Stage 2 are subtracted from Firm 1s proÞt and added to the signing
consumers welfare level.
Equilibrium multiplicity is pervasive when exclusive contracts are possi-
ble18. Following the existing literature, and in order to rule out situations
where exclusive contracts result only from of a lack of coordination between
consumers or Þrms (a possibility arising for example in RRW), we restrict
18See, e.g., BW, SW, OBrien and Shaﬀer, (1997).
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our attention to perfect coalition-proof Nash equilibria (PCPNE), as deÞned
in Bernheim et al. (1987).
Proposition 1 In any PCPNE, ineﬃcient entry deterrence occurs if and
only if it maximizes the joint surplus of the incumbent and the two consumers,
i.e. if U1 + bπ1 > V + π1.
Notice that for exclusion to happen in Proposition 1, it must be the case
that π2 > 0. The reason is that, if π2 = 0, Assumption (3) is equivalent to
U1 + bπ1 < V + π1. Consequently, under the assumptions of RRW and SW,
exclusion cannot occur in a PCPNE is discrimination is prohibited.
3.2 Simple exclusive contracts with discrimination
We assume now that the incumbent can discriminate among consumers. In
this case, exclusion is more likely because in order to exclude, the incumbent
only needs to convince one consumer to sign an exclusive contract: if it does,
the entrant will decide to serve no consumer at all rather than only one, and
the incumbent will exert its market power vis-à-vis both consumers while
only having to compensate one of them.
Proposition 2 In any PCPNE, ineﬃcient entry deterrence occurs if and
only if U1 + 2bπ1 > V + 2π1, i.e. if the joint surplus of Firm 1 and one
consumer is greater under exclusion than under no-exclusion.
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Proposition 2 coincides with Proposition 3 in SW if the special assump-
tions of RRW are made. The proof of this result is straightforward. Coalition-
proofness implies that for Firm 1 to induce a consumer to enter into an ex-
clusive contract, it must guarantee this consumer a welfare level equal to at
least V . Indeed, if in equilibrium both consumers earn less than V , they
could form a coalition and jointly decide not to sign contracts. This would
yield each consumer a welfare level of V (because Firm 2s entry would not
be deterred) and not signing would be an equilibrium (since signing an ex-
clusive contract when the other consumer does not would cause the signing
consumers welfare level to fall below V ). Therefore, Firm 1 can sign an ex-
clusive contract only against a lump-sum transfer equal to at least V − U1,
which is the minimum amount needed to keep the signing consumers wel-
fare level equal to V while deterring entry. Firm 1s maximum proÞt when
oﬀering such an exclusive contract is thus 2bπ1 + V − Ui (because, as a con-
sequence of assumption (4), Firm 2 will decide not to enter if it observes
that a consumer signed an exclusive contract), and such a contract is oﬀered
only if this is greater than the proÞt which Firm 1 could earn by oﬀering no
contract at all, i.e. 2π1.
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3.3 Exclusive contracts with discrimination and breach
penalties
We now increase contract complexity by allowing Firm 1 to oﬀer contracts
including a breach penalty clause.19 The game is changed accordingly, as
follows.
Stage 1. Firm 1 may oﬀer each consumer a contract specifying that (i) the
consumer commits not to purchase from Firm 2; (ii) a lump-sum transfer from
Firm 1 to the consumer; and (iii) a penalty which the consumer must pay to
Firm 1 if it breaches the exclusivity requirement. Firm 1 can discriminate
across consumers.
Stage 2. Consumers simultaneously decide whether to sign the contracts
possibly oﬀered to them in Stage 1.
Stage 3. Observing the outcome of Stage 2, Firm 2 may decide to of-
fer some consumers a lump-sum payment in exchange for these consumers
breaching the exclusive contract signed with Firm 1.
Stage 4. Consumers who signed an exclusive contract in Stage 2 and were
oﬀered by Firm 2 to breach it in Stage 3 decide whether to accept Firm 2s
oﬀer. A consumer breaching an exclusive contract signed in Stage 2 receives
19Unlike SW, we choose to address the question of breach penalties without modifying
the assumptions about the Þrms cost structure. This will allow us to assess what exactly
the impact of allowing for breach penalty provisions is, leaving everything else unchanged.
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the lump-sum payment proposed by Firm 2 in Stage 3, and pays Firm 1 the
breach penalty provided for as per the exclusive contract it breaches.
Stage 5. Firm 2 decides which consumers it wants to serve. It cannot
decide to serve a consumer who signed an exclusive contract in Stage 2 and
did not breach it in Stage 4. Each consumers welfare level and each Þrms
proÞt is then determined according to Firm 2s choices in Stage 5. Lump-sum
payments or breach penalties provided in the various contracts are added to
or subtracted from Þrms proÞts and consumers welfare level.
The following result, proved in the appendix, shows that if exclusive con-
tracts can include breach penalty provisions, then Firm 2s exclusion occurs
only if the joint surplus of Firm 1, Firm 2, and one consumer, is greater
under exclusion than under competition.
Proposition 3 If breach penalties are possible, then ineﬃcient entry de-
terrence occurs if and only if the joint surplus of both Þrms and one con-
sumer is greater under exclusion than under no exclusion: (i) if U1 + 2bπ1 >
V +2π1+2π2, then Firm 2 is excluded in any PCPNE; and (ii) if U1+2bπ1 <
V + 2π1 + 2π2, then both Þrms serve both consumers in any PCPNE.
Remarks.
1. If the assumptions of RRWare made, then allowing for breach penalties
has no impact on the likelihood of exclusion. This is because, following the
logic of Aghion and Bolton (1987), the role of breach penalties is to induce
18
the entrant to transfer part of its rent to the pair comprising the incumbent
and one consumer. But in RRW, the entrant has no rent, because both Þrms
earn zero proÞts under competition. In a more general setting however, Þrms
may earn positive proÞts under competition. The possibility of introducing
breach penalties in exclusive contracts in that case reduces the likelihood
of exclusion, without eliminating it. What makes ineﬃcient exclusion still
possible is that the condition stated in Proposition 3 only takes into account
one consumer (in addition to both Þrms).
2. The fact that breach penalties make exclusion less likely should come
as no surprise, because they facilitate the transfer of an entrants rent to the
incumbent, and thus makes entry deterrence less attractive. This may seem
to counter Aghion and Boltons famous (1987) result that breach penalty
provisions may cause ineﬃcient exclusion. But there is in fact no contra-
diction, because that result is entirely driven by informational asymmetries,
which sometimes cause the incumbent to exclude by mistake, having set too
high a penalty. In Aghion and Bolton (1987) just like in the present paper,
the purpose of exclusive contracts with breach penalty provisions is not to
exclude, but rather to be breached and generate a penalty payment.
19
3.4 Exclusive contracts with breach penalties and con-
ditional oﬀers
We now further complexify the institutional setup by considering the pos-
sibility for contracts to be conditional on the acceptance of other contracts
by other consumers. The previous game is modiÞed as follows. In Stage 3,
having observed the outcome of Stage 2, Firm 2 can make the following oﬀers
to consumers. To consumers who signed an exclusive contract with Firm 1,
it may oﬀer a lump-sum payment in exchange for breaching it. From con-
sumers who did not sign an exclusive contract with Firm 1, it may ask for
a lump-sum transfer (from the consumer to itself). Finally, if Firm 2 makes
oﬀers to both consumers (counting as an oﬀer also the demand for a lump-
sum transfer from a consumer), it may state that a given oﬀer to a consumer
is valid only if some other oﬀer is accepted by another consumer in Stage 4.
Then, in Stage 4, consumers who were made oﬀers by Firm 2 in Stage 3 de-
cide whether to take them up or not. If these oﬀers were made conditionally
on acceptance by both consumers, and only one of them accepts the oﬀer
made by Firm 2, then the acceptance decision is not taken into account. In
particular, if a consumer (say, consumer a) signed an exclusive contract in
Stage 2, agreed to breach it in Stage 3, but Firm 2s oﬀer to breach it was
conditional on consumer b making a lump-sum payment to Firm 2, and this
last oﬀer was not taken up, then consumer a remains bound by the exclusive
contract signed with Firm 1.
20
The following result, proved in the appendix, shows that this contrac-
tual environment is rich enough to allow Coasian bargaining to take place,
implying that ineﬃcient exclusion cannot occur in a PCPNE.
Proposition 4 Under the above assumptions, ineﬃcient entry deterrence
does not occur in a PCPNE.
4 Foreclosing an already present competitor
We assume now that both Þrms are present at the time when contracts can
be oﬀered to consumers and that both are on an equal footing as regards the
ability to oﬀer contracts. This section assesses whether exclusion may occur
in a PCPNE in diﬀerent contractual environments.
4.1 Simple exclusive contracts without discrimination
We assume in this subsection that (i) each Þrm must oﬀer the same contracts
to both consumers, and (ii) only simple exclusive or non-exclusive contracts
are allowed. A contract mentions a lump-sum transfer and, possibly, an
exclusivity clause. The timing of the game is as follows.
Stage 1. Both Þrms oﬀer as many contracts as they wish (possibly none)
to each consumer. They cannot discriminate across consumers.
Stage 2. Consumers simultaneously decide whether to sign the contracts
possibly oﬀered to them in Stage 1. The lump-sum payments corresponding
21
to the contracts which end up being signed are made.
Stage 3. Observing the outcome of Stage 2, both Þrms simultaneously
decide which consumers they want to serve. A Þrm cannot serve a consumer
who signed an exclusive contract with the other Þrm in Stage 2 (assuming
such a contract has been oﬀered and accepted). However a Þrm can serve a
consumer with whom it did not sign a contract at the previous stage, and it
is obliged to serve consumers with whom it is bound by a contract signed in
Stage 2.
In this setting, as Proposition 5, proved in the appendix, establishes,
ineﬃcient exclusion cannot occur in equilibrium. The reason is simple: the
prohibition of discrimination implies that when oﬀering contracts, the po-
tentially excluding Þrm (Firm 1) takes into account the utility level of both
consumers. But the fact that both Þrms make simultaneous oﬀers implies that
Firm 2 is able to transfer its proÞts to consumers (through non-exclusive con-
tracts together with lump-sum payments) in order to deter them from signing
exclusive contracts with Firm 1. This ability for Firm 2 to make lump-sum
payments to consumers implies that Firm 2s proÞts are taken into account
in the relationship between Firm 1 and consumers. Therefore, all parties are
taken into account, and the equilibrium outcome must be eﬃcient.
Proposition 5 Ineﬃcient exclusion cannot occur in a PCPNE.
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4.2 Simple exclusive contracts with discrimination
In this subsection, the structure of the game is unchanged and we still assume
that only simple exclusive or non-exclusive contracts are allowed, but we
relax the no-discrimination rule. As Proposition 6 shows, the possibility
to discriminate causes ineﬃcient exclusion to occur in equilibrium for some
parameter values. The reason is that, if discrimination is allowed, Firm
1 needs only one consumer to sign an exclusive contract in order to evict
Firm 2. The parties whose surplus is taken into account when contracts
are oﬀered and taken up are thus Firm 1 (which has the choice whether to
oﬀer an exclusive contract)20, one consumer (the one to whom a hypothetical
exclusive contract is oﬀered), and Firm 2 (which can transfer its expected
proÞts by oﬀering non-exclusive contracts). This leaves out one of the two
consumers. Exclusion thus occurs if it maximizes the joint surplus of Þrms
and one consumer - which is possible even if exclusion is socially ineﬃcient.
Proposition 6 Under the assumptions made above, there exists a PCPNE
in which no Þrm is excluded, and there exists no PCPNE in which Firm 1 is
excluded. If, and only if 2bπ1+U1 > 2π1+2π2+V , there also exists a PCPNE
in which the ineﬃcient exclusion of Firm 2 occurs.
Corollary. 1. Ineﬃcient eviction of an already present competitor is
possible. In particular, in the RRW model, if cost and preference parameters
20Firm 2 also has the option of oﬀering an exclusive contract, but this cannot be an
equilibrium strategy because Firm 1 faces no increasing returns and there are thus no
cross-customer externalities regarding the acceptance of exclusive contracts hypothetically
oﬀered by Firm 2.
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are such that exclusion occurs when Firm 2 is a potential entrant, it also
occurs (in one of the two PCPNE) when Firm 2 is already present and Þrms
can only oﬀer simple exclusive contracts.
2. With simple exclusive contracts, eﬃcient eviction is however less likely
than ineﬃcient entry deterrence.
Proof of the corollary. Claim 1 results from the fact that under the
assumptions of RRW, π1 = π2 = 0, so that the condition for discrimination
to occur in Proposition 6 coincides with that in Proposition 2. Claim 2 results
from the assumption that π2 ≥ 0.
Proposition 6 provides additional support to the idea that in the presence
of increasing returns, exclusive contracts can be used to foreclose consumers
by discriminating among them so as to exclude rivals. This strategy may
deter entry, as stated in RRW or SW, but it may also cause the ineﬃcient
eviction of a rival already present in the market.
4.3 Exclusive contracts with breach penalties
We now increase contract complexity by allowing Þrms to oﬀer contracts in-
cluding a breach penalty clause. In order to make this possibility meaningful,
the time structure of the game is modiÞed as follows:
Stage 1. Both Þrms oﬀer contracts to each consumer. A contract may
be exclusive or non-exclusive. An exclusive contract between Firm i and a
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consumer may include a breach penalty clause specifying (i) a payment to
be made to Firm i should the consumer breach the exclusivity requirement
while still dealing with Firm i; and (ii) a payment to be made to Firm i
should the consumer breach the exclusivity requirement by not dealing at all
with Firm i.21 Discrimination across consumers is allowed.
Stage 2. Consumers simultaneously decide whether to sign the contracts
possibly oﬀered to them in Stage 1.
Stage 3. Each Þrm may oﬀer contracts to consumers who signed in Stage
2 an exclusive contract with the other Þrm.22
Stage 4. Consumers simultaneously decide whether to sign the contracts
possibly oﬀered to them in Stage 3, taking into account the obligations im-
posed upon them by the contracts signed in Stage 2.
Stage 5. Observing the outcome of Stages 2 and 4, both Þrms simultane-
ously decide which consumers they want to serve. A Þrm is obliged to serve
a consumer who signed (and did not breach) a contract it proposed, and it
cannot serve a consumer who signed an exclusive contract with the other
21For the sake of tractability, we do not allow for breach penalties in non-exclusive
contracts, i.e. for clauses stating that a consumer must compensate a Þrm for deciding
not to deal with it (for example by signing an exclusive contract with a competitor) after
having signed a non-exclusive contract. Adding this possibility would only complicate the
resolution of the game without changing the results.
22The assumption that a Þrm may oﬀer a contract in Stage 3 only to consumers who
previously signed an exclusive contract with the other Þrm is made for tractability. The
results would not change under more general assumptions (e.g., if both Þrms were allowed
to oﬀer contracts to both consumers in Stage 3, irrespective of the actions taken in previous
stages).
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Þrm in Stage 2 unless this contract has been breached. It is free to serve or
not to serve consumers with whom it is not bound by a contract, and who
are not bound by an exclusive contract signed with the other Þrm.
The following Proposition, proved in the appendix, shows that if both
Þrms make oﬀers simultaneously and contracts may include provisions for
breach penalties, then exclusion cannot occur in a PCPNE.
Proposition 7 If both Þrms can oﬀer contracts simultaneously and exclusive
contracts can include provisions for breach penalties, then ineﬃcient exclu-
sion cannot occur in a PCPNE. In addition, both Þrms earn zero proÞts in
any PCPNE.
The reason why both Þrms earn zero proÞts if breach penalty provisions
are allowed is that these clauses allow Firm i to induce Firm j to transfer
its proÞts to the pair formed by Firm i and any consumer. When both Þrms
can do that, competition results into each Þrm "forcing" the other one to
transfer its entire proÞts to consumers. As is proved in the appendix, this
logic implies that ineﬃcient exclusion cannot occur in equilibrium.
Proposition 7 means that when both Þrms can simultaneously make of-
fers, the degree of contract complexity needed for ineﬃcient exclusion to be
ruled out is less than in the incumbent-entrant case, as there is no need to
supplement breach penalty provisions with the possibility of making condi-
tional oﬀers. One can however check that conditional oﬀers are redundant
if both Þrms can oﬀer contracts and breach penalty provisions are possible,
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in that if they were allowed, ineﬃcient exclusion still could not occur in a
PCPNE.
5 Conclusion
[INSERT TABLE 2]
The main result of the paper is that as soon as too complex contracts are
ruled out, exclusive contracts may cause socially ineﬃcient eviction, and not
only entry deterrence, even though the former is less likely than the latter.
In terms of real-world applicability, this theory of foreclosure (as well
related ones such as in RRW, SW and BW) does not require an outcome
as extreme as full exit by the excluded Þrm. "Exit" should be considered
as a continuous variable: rather than fully exiting, a Þrm may scale down
investment (in R&D, production facilities, or marketing). The analysis is ex-
actly the same as long as the investment variable involves some increasing
returns, in the sense that for a given level of investment, the induced increase
in demand is reduced if the Þrm is barred from serving a given set of con-
sumers (for example, a Þxed investment allowing a Þrm to lower its variable
costs could Þt into this theory). In such a setting, partial consumer foreclo-
sure induces a Þrm to scale down investment, which reduces the competitive
constraint it is able to exert vis-à-vis those consumers who did not sign an
exclusive contract - thus enhancing the market power enjoyed by the Þrm
oﬀering exclusive contracts vis-à-vis all consumers.
27
While this paper extends the existing theory and shows that anticompet-
itive exclusive contracts may arise in more general settings than had been
established so far, further work is probably required in order to clarify the
"complexity metric". In our quest for an institutional setting rich enough
to permit Coasian bargaining, we did not proceed according to a predeter-
mined metric over contractual environments. For example, while it seems
straightforward to consider that contracts conditional on many variables are
more complex than contracts conditional on fewer variables, there is much
less clarity as to whether a game with many moves and countermoves is more
or less complex, and more or less plausible, than a game with simultaneous
moves. In other words, our claim that "simple" contractual environments
allow ineﬃcient exclusion to take place, while "rich" contractual environ-
ments do not, is not founded on a rigorous theory of what a simple or a rich
environment is. Progress towards a complexity metric could pave the way
for more general results about how much complexity is required for Coasian
bargaining to take place, both in the "incumbent-entrant" case and in the
"two-incumbent" case.
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No exclusionTwo
Incumbents
No exclusion
(Prop. 4)
Entrant-
IncumbentDiscrimination + 
breach penalties + 
conditional offers
No exclusion
(Prop. 7)
Two
Incumbents
Exclusion
(Prop. 3)No exclusion (Prop. 3)
Entrant-
Incumbent
Discrimination + 
breach penalties
Existence of PCPNE with and
without exclusion
(Prop. 6)
No exclusion
(Prop. 6)
Two
Incumbents
Exclusion
(Prop. 2, generalizing RRW and SW)
No 
exclusion
(Prop. 2)
Entrant-
Incumbent
Discrimination
No exclusion
(Prop. 5)
Two
Incumbents
Exclusion
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No exclusion
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Incumbent
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6 Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1
Consider a hypothetical equilibrium in which exclusion occurs, and let
V ∗ denote each consumers utility level in this hypothetical equilibrium (the
no-discrimination clause implies that in equilibrium both consumers enjoy
the same utility level). It must be the case that V ∗ ≥ V . Assume indeed
that this is not the case and that V ∗ < V . In this case, there necessarily
exists an equilibrium in which no consumer accepts the exclusive contract
oﬀered by Firm 1 and both consumers enjoy a utility level of V . Indeed, if
consumer a rejects the contract, then consumer bs utility from rejecting it
as well is V (since rejection by both induces Firm 2 to enter and allows each
consumer to be served by both Þrms). If consumer a takes up the contract,
then he will be served by Firm 1 alone and be paid the lump-sum transfer
provided for in the exclusive contract oﬀered by Firm 1. He will get the utility
level V ∗. If V ∗ < V , rejection by both consumers is thus a Pareto-superior
equilibrium of the continuation game than acceptance. This implies that in
any PCPNE involving exclusion, V ∗ ≥ V . Since the joint surplus of Firm 1
and consumers is 2(bπ1+U1), Firm 1s proÞt is at most equal to 2(bπ1+U1−V ).
For exclusion to be an equilibrium outcome, it must then be the case that
2(bπ1 + U1 − V ) ≥ 2π1, or equivalently bπ1 + U1 ≥ π1 + V Otherwise, Firm 1
could increase its proÞt to 2π1 by oﬀering no contract at all.
We show now that the converse is true: if bπ1+U1 > π1+V , then exclusion
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must occur in equilibrium. Under no exclusion, Firm 1s proÞt is π1. But
Firm 1 could earn greater proÞts by oﬀering the following contract: oﬀer
each consumer an exclusive contract against a lump-sum transfer equal to
V − U1 + ε, with ε > 0. Clearly, accepting such a contract increases each
consumers utility level by ε (if acceptance is pivotal in deterring Firm 2s
entry) or by V −U1+ε (if acceptance is not pivotal). Accepting this contract
is thus a dominant strategy, and this contract is accepted by both consumers
in equilibrium. Firm 1s proÞt is equal to bπ1− (V −U1)− ε, which is strictly
greater than π1 if ε is small enough. Oﬀering an exclusive contract which
will be accepted by consumers is thus a dominant strategy for Firm 1. QED.
Proof of Proposition 2
First step: if U1 + 2bπ1 > V + 2π1, then exclusion occurs in all PCPNE.We
assume that U1+2bπ1 > V +2π1. In a hypothetical no-exclusion equilibrium,
Firm 1s proÞt would be 2π1. Now consider the following strategy for Firm 1:
oﬀer consumer a an exclusive contract against a payment equal to V −U1+ε,
where ε is strictly positive and small, and no contract to consumer b. If con-
sumer a accepts this oﬀer, Firm 2 is deterred from entering and consumer as
surplus is thus U1 + (V − U1 + ε) = V + ε, which is greater than the utility
level V it would earn if it rejected the oﬀer, triggering Firm 2s entry. But
then, Firm 1s proÞt will be 2bπ1− (V −U1+ε), which is strictly greater than
2π1 if ε is small enough. Therefore, oﬀering an exclusive contract which is
taken up by consumer a allows Firm 1 to increase its proÞt with respect to a
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hypothetical equilibrium in which Firm 2 is not excluded. This implies that
exclusion occurs in equilibrium. More precisely, one can check that the only
PCPNE of this game is such that Firm 1 oﬀers one consumer an exclusive
contract against a payment equal to V − U1, which that consumer accepts,
thus deterring Firm 2 from entering.
Second step: if U1 + 2bπ1 < V + 2π1, then exclusion does not occur in any PCPNE.
We assume that U1+2bπ1 < V +2π1. By oﬀering no exclusive contract, Firm
1 can obtain a proÞt equal to 2π1. We consider now a hypothetical PCPNE
involving Firm 2s exclusion. First, we claim that in any such PCPNE, at
least one consumers utility level is no smaller than V , and that each con-
sumers utility level is above U1. By signing no contract at all, any consumer
is certain to be served at least by Firm 1, which yields a surplus equal to
U1. This implies that each consumers surplus is greater than or equal to
U1. Then, assume that both consumers equilibrium utility levels are below
V . This means that each exclusive contract taken up in equilibrium involves
a lump-sum payment strictly smaller than V −U1. But this implies the exis-
tence of an equilibrium of the subgame starting in Period 2 (when consumers
decide whether they will sign contracts) in which no consumer signs a con-
tract, yielding each consumer a utility level of V (because Firm 2 enters if no
consumer signs an exclusive contract with Firm 1). This equilibrium of the
continuation subgame starting in Period 2 yields both consumers a strictly
greater utility than the hypothetical equilibrium, which is therefore not a
PCPNE. Second, the fact that in any PCPNE involving exclusion, one con-
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sumers utility level is greater than or equal to V , while the other consumers
utility level is greater than or equal to U1 implies that in such an equilibrium,
Firm 1s proÞt is no greater than 2(U1 + bπ1)−V −U1, which is smaller than
2π1 by assumption. Therefore, Firm 1 could increase its proÞt by oﬀering
no contract at all and earning 2π1, so that exclusion does not occur in a
PCPNE. QED.
Proof of Proposition 3. First, notice that in any equilibrium with
exclusion, each consumer gets a utility level of at least U1 and at least one of
them gets a utility level greater than or equal to V (the proof of this claim is
the same as in the proof of Proposition 2). This implies that the maximum
proÞt which Firm 1 can earn by excluding Firm 2 is 2bπ1 − (V − U1). We
now show that the maximum proÞt which Firm 1 can earn in an equilibrium
in which Firm 2 is not excluded is equal to 2π1 + 2π2. In a no-exclusion
equilibrium, no consumer signs a contract, so that each consumers utility
level is equal to V . Since Firm 2s equilibrium proÞt must be nonnegative
(otherwise it could do better by deciding to serve no consumer), this implies
that Firm 1s proÞt is smaller than or equal to 2π1 + 2π2. What remains
to be shown is that Firm 1 can oﬀer a contract such that the only PCPNE
of the continuation game yields it a proÞt arbitrarily close to 2π1 + 2π2
while inducing no exclusion. Consider the following strategy: Firm 1 oﬀers
consumer a an exclusive contract, together with a lump-sum payment of
V −U1 and a breach penalty equal to 2π2 + V −U1 − ε (with ε very small).
If consumer a accepts such a contract, Firm 2 will be ready to oﬀer him
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to breach it against a payment comprised between 2π2 − ε and 2π2, and
consumer a will be better oﬀ accepting such an oﬀer. His utility will then
be greater than V + (V − U1) − (2π2 + V − U1 − ε) + (2π2 − ε) = V ,
so that consumer a is better oﬀ accepting Firm 1s oﬀer than rejecting it.
This proves that Firm 1 can oﬀer a contract inducing Firm 2 to enter, and
yielding itself a proÞt arbitrarily close to 2π1 + 2π2. As a consequence, if
2π1 + 2π2 > 2bπ1 − (V − U1), then Firm 1s optimal strategy is to oﬀer an
exclusive contract together with a breach penalty clause which will induce
Firm 2 to enter. In this case, one can easily check that the only PCPNE is
such that Firm 1 oﬀers consumer a (or b) an exclusive contract together with
a lump-sum payment of V −U1 and a breach penalty equal to 2π2 +V −U1.
Firm 2 then enters and oﬀers this consumer to breach the exclusive contract
against a payment of 2π2. Conversely, if 2π1 + 2π2 < 2bπ1 − (V − U1), then
Firm 1s optimal strategy is to oﬀer an exclusive contract with no provision
for breach (or with prohibitively high breach penalties). QED.
Proof of Proposition 4. Consider the following oﬀer by Firm 1 in Stage
1: Firm 1 oﬀers consumer a an exclusive contract together with a lump-sum
payment of V −U1+ε and a breach penalty equal to 2π2+2(V −U1)−ε (with
ε very small). Consumer a obviously takes up this contract in Stage 2, since
it guarantees him a utility level equal to at least V + ε (in case he decides
not to breach it). Then, consider Stage 3. Firm 2 cannot induce consumer a
to breach the contract by making an unconditional oﬀer. Indeed, Firm 2 is
willing to give up at most the entirety of its foreseeable proÞt, or 2π2. But
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if consumer a breaches the exclusive contract against a payment of 2π2, this
results into (i) a gain of V − U1 due to the shift from being served by Firm
1 alone to being served by both Þrms, (ii) a gain of 2π2 (Firm 2s bribe for
breaching the contract), and (iii) the breach penalty 2π2 + 2(V − U1) − ε,
leading to a loss of (V − U1) − ε. Firm 2 can induce consumer a to breach
the exclusive contract by simultaneously (i) oﬀering consumer a to breach
the contract against a payment 2π2 + (V − U1) − η (with 0<η < ε); (ii)
requiring consumer b to pay V − U1 − ε0 with ε0 < η; and (iii) stating that
the oﬀer to consumer a is conditional on consumer b accepting to make this
payment. Clearly, in any PCPNE of the continuation game starting in Stage
4, both consumers decide to accept these oﬀers. Consumer a risks nothing: if
consumer b does not accept, then accepting has no consequence for consumer
a, who remains bound by his exclusive contract with Firm 1. On the other
hand, if consumer b accepts, consumer a ends up with a utility level equal to
V+ε+(ε− η), which is greater than the level V+ε which it would achieve if
it did not accept Firm 2s oﬀer. Regarding consumer bs incentive to accept
Firm 2s requirement for a payment of V − U1 − ε0, notice that if consumer
a takes up Firm 2s conditional oﬀer, then (i) if consumer b rejects Firm
2s requirement, consumer a will remain bound by the exclusive contract
signed with Firm 1 (by virtue of the conditional nature of Firm 2s oﬀer),
so that Firm 2 will decide to serve no consumer in Stage 6, and consumer
b will be subjected to Firm 1s monopoly power and have a utility level
equal to U1. On the other hand, if consumer b accepts Firm 2s requirement,
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consumer a will be released from the exclusive contract signed with Firm 1,
Firm 2 will thus decide to serve both consumers, and consumer b will enjoy
a utility level equal to V -(V − U1 − ε0) = U1 + ε0. Thus, both consumers
have an interest in accepting Firm 2s oﬀer, inducing Firm 2 to serve both
consumers. Firm 2s proÞt is in turn equal to the proÞt it would normally
earn when serving both consumers, minus its "bribe" to release consumer
a from his exclusive contract, plus the payment made by consumer b, i.e.
2π2 − [2π2 + (V − U1)− η] + [V − U1 − ε0] = η − ε0 > 0. Thus, faced with
the aforementioned contract oﬀered by Firm 1 in Stage 1, consumer a has
an incentive to take it up, and Firm 2 can make a positive proÞt by oﬀering
to bribe consumer a into breaching the exclusive contract conditionally on
consumer b making a payment to Firm 2. Therefore, in any PCPNE of the
continuation game starting in Stage 2, the breach penalty is paid to Firm
1, which thus earns its "duopoly proÞt" 2π1 minus the lump-sum transfer
(V − U1 + ε) paid to consumer a upon signing the exclusive contract, plus
the breach penalty 2π2+2(V −U1)−ε, or in total 2π1+2π2+(V −U1)−2ε.
Therefore, Firm 1 can earn a proÞt arbitrarily close to [2π1 + 2π2 + (V − U1)]
while inducing Firm 2 to serve both consumers.
In contrast, the maximum proÞt which Firm 1 can earn while excluding
Firm 2 is 2bπ1 + U1 − V , because in any equilibrium with exclusion, each
consumer gets a utility level of at least U1 and at least one of them gets a
utility level greater than or equal to V (the proof of this claim is the same as in
the proof of Proposition 2). Assumption (3), stating that exclusion is socially
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ineﬃcient, is equivalent to 2π1+2π2+(V −U1)>2bπ1+V −U1, implying that
Firm 1s proÞt-maximizing strategy in Stage 1 involves oﬀering a contract
such as the one described above, leading to no exclusion. Therefore, no
PCPNE involves exclusion in equilibrium. Finally, one can easily check that
the strategies described above, with η = ε = ε0 = 0, deÞne a PCPNE. QED.
Proof of Proposition 5.
Step 1. There exists a subgame perfect equilibrium such that (i) the equi-
librium of the continuation subgame starting in period 2 is coalition-proof,
(ii) Firm i (for i = 1 and i = 2) oﬀers both consumers an exclusive contract
with a lump-sum transfer tei = bπi − πi +Max[0,(bπj +Uj)− (πj + V )] and a
non-exclusive contract with a lump-sum transfer of tni = Max[0,(bπj +Uj)−
(πj + V )] (with the notation {i; j} = {1; 2}); and (iii) consumers choose to
accept both Þrms non-exclusive oﬀers.
Proof. First, these transfers are such that each consumer is better oﬀ ac-
cepting both non-exclusive oﬀers (which yields a payoﬀ V + tn1 + tn2) than
accepting Firm is exclusive oﬀer (which yields a payoﬀ Ui + tei), while be-
ing indiﬀerent between these two options if tnj > 0. Accepting both Þrms
non-exclusive oﬀers is thus a weakly dominant strategy and thus deÞnes a
PCPNE of the continuation game. Second, consider Þrms actions in period
1. If the contracts oﬀered by Firm j are as described above, the cheapest way
for Firm i to induce a consumer to be served by both Þrms in equilibrium
involves oﬀering a non-exclusive contract with the smallest positive lump-
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sum transfer required to make the consumer indiﬀerent between accepting
both Þrms non-exclusive contracts and accepting Firm js exclusive contract.
This minimal lump-sum transfer is equal to Max [0;Uj + tej − V − tnj] =
Max[0,(bπj + Uj) − (πj + V )] = tni. Similarly, the cheapest way for Firm i
to induce a consumer to purchase from Firm i only in equilibrium involves
oﬀering an exclusive contract with the smallest positive lump-sum transfer
required to make the consumer indiﬀerent between accepting Firm is ex-
clusive contract, and either of the two contracts oﬀered by Firm j. This
minimal lump-sum transfer is equal toMax [0;Uj + tej − Ui;V + tnj − Ui] =
Max[0; bπj − πj +Max[0, (bπi + Ui) − (πi + V )];(bπj + Uj) − (πj + V )] ≥ tei.
But, since bπi − tei = πi − tni, Firm is maximal proÞt, given Firm js of-
fers, can be obtained by oﬀering a non-exclusive contract with a lump-sum
payment equal to tni. Firm is best response to Firm js actions is thus
such that Firm i oﬀers a non-exclusive contract with a lump-sum payment
of tni, and an exclusive contract with a lump-sum payment smaller than or
equal to Max [0;Uj + tej − Ui;V + tnj − Ui]. Oﬀering a non-exclusive con-
tract with a lump-sum payment of tni, and an exclusive contract with a
lump-sum payment of tei is thus a best response to Firm js actions. This
proves that the actions described above deÞne a subgame-perfect equilib-
rium. This also proves that there exists a PCPNE involving no exclu-
sion, and that in this PCPNE, Firm is proÞt is greater than or equal to
2 (Min[πi, (π1 + π2 + V )− (bπj + Uj)]). Indeed, in any hypothetical exclu-
sionary subgame perfect equilibrium, one of the Þrms earns zero, and is thus
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worse oﬀ than in the non-exclusionary equilibrium described above, which
implies that there exists at least one non-exclusionary PCPNE.
Step 2. We show that the equilibrium described above is a PCPNE.
Proof. This is equivalent to showing that there exists no subgame-perfect
equilibrium such that the continuation subgame starting in period 2 is a
PCPNE, and such that (i) each consumer is served by both Þrms and (ii)
for one Þrm at least, say Þrm i, the equilibrium proÞt is strictly greater
than 2 (Min[πi, (π1 + π2 + V )− (bπj + Uj)]). Assume Þrst that (bπj + Uj) ≤
(πj + V ) and that Firm is equilibrium proÞt is greater than 2πi. This
means that one of the consumers signs a non-exclusive contract with Firm
i involving a strictly positive payment to Firm i, which is impossible since
this strategy would be dominated by not signing any contract with Firm i.
Assume now that (bπj + Uj) > (πj + V ) and that Firm is equilibrium proÞt
is strictly greater than 2[(π1+π2+V )− (bπj +Uj)]. This means that at least
one consumer receives a lump-sum payment from Firm 1 which is strictly
lower than (bπj + Uj) − (πj + V ). But if this is the case, then faced with
Firm is equilibrium non-exclusive oﬀer and a hypothetical exclusive oﬀer
proposed by Firm j together with a lump-sum transfer equal to bπj − πj − ε
for small enough ε, this consumer would choose the latter. This implies that,
by oﬀering such an exclusive contract, Firm j could increase its proÞt by at
least ε (the reason for this is that in equilibrium the non-exclusive contracts
picked by consumers necessarily involve nonnegative transfers from Þrms to
43
consumers). This contradicts the assumption that both consumers are served
by both Þrms in equilibrium.
Step 3. We assume now that there exists a PCPNE in which one of the
consumers (at least) is served by only one Þrm. Let tei and tni denote re-
spectively Firm is lump-sum transfer associated with the best (from the
consumers viewpoint) exclusive and a non-exclusive contract it oﬀers (of-
fering no contract can be interpreted as oﬀering a transfer equal to minus
inÞnity, which will be rejected by consumers in any subgame perfect equilib-
rium of the continuation game). Assume that consumer a is served by one
Þrm only, say Firm i. Since both consumers are oﬀered the same contracts,
they both get the same utility level U∗. But U∗ ≥Max(V +πj, Uj + bπj), be-
cause otherwise Firm j would have an interest in oﬀering to each consumer
it does not serve in the hypothetical equilibrium a non-exclusive contract
together with a lump-sum payment equal to πj − ε, as well as an exclusive
contract together with a lump-sum payment equal to bπj−ε, with ε > 0 being
very small. Such a contract would be picked by any consumer being oﬀered
it (because it would yield a payoﬀ greater than U∗), and this would increase
Firm js proÞt. Since both consumers are oﬀered the same contracts, Firm is
proÞt is the same as the one it would earn if both consumers were picking an
exclusive contract it oﬀers (otherwise, this means that Firm i could increase
its proÞt by oﬀering only an exclusive contract to both consumers, or only
a non-exclusive contract to both consumers). Firm is equilibrium proÞt is
thus equal to 2(bπi +Ui−U∗) ≤ 2Min(bπi +Ui−V − πj, bπi +Ui−Uj − bπj) ≤
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2Min(πi, (π1 + π2 + V )− (bπj +Uj)), which is smaller than or equal to Firm
is proÞt in some non-exclusionary PCPNE, as shown in Step 1. This im-
plies that the hypothetical exclusive PCPNE is Pareto-dominated, from the
point of view of Þrms, by some non-exclusive PCPNE. This implies that all
PCPNE are non-exclusive.
Proof of Proposition 6.
First, it can easily be checked that the PCPNE described in Step 1 of
the proof of Proposition 5 is still a PCPNE when discriminatory oﬀers are
allowed.
Second, we show that in any PCPNE, Firm 1 serves both consumers.
Assume that there exists an equilibrium in which one consumer at least,
say consumer a, is not served by Firm 1. This means that in equilibrium
consumer a signs an exclusive contract with Firm 2, against some lump-sum
payment te2. But the inequality U2 + tae2 ≥Max[bπ1 +U1;π1 + V ] must hold,
because otherwise Firm 1 could increase its proÞt by oﬀering consumer a an
exclusive contract against a lump-sum transfer equal to U2+tae2−U1+ε and a
non-exclusive contract against a lump-sum transfer equal to U2+ tae2−V +ε,
which would be chosen by consumer a while yielding Firm 1 a strictly positive
proÞt if ε is small enough. In equilibrium, Firm 2 necessarily serves consumer
b (this is because Firm 2 loses money when serving one consumer only, so
that if it serves consumer a it must also serve consumer b). Let us deÞne
π2b=π2 − t2b if in equilibrium consumer b is served by both Þrms and Firm 2
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pays consumer b a lump-sum transfer t2b , and π2b=bπ2 − t2b if in equilibrium
consumer b is served by Firm 2 only and Firm 2 pays consumer b a lump-sum
transfer t2b . The inequality U2+t
a
e2 ≥Max[bπ1+U1;π1+V ] implies that Firm
2s equilibrium proÞt is smaller than π2b+bπ2+U2−Max[bπ1+U1;π1+V ]. But,
as proved above, there also exists an equilibrium which is a PCPNE of the
subgame starting in Period 2, such that in period 1 Firm i (for i = 1 and
i = 2) oﬀers consumer a an exclusive contract with a lump-sum transfer
t0ei = bπi−πi+Max[0,(bπj +Uj)− (πj +V )] and a non-exclusive contract with
a lump-sum transfer of t0ni = Max[0,(bπj +Uj)− (πj +V )] (with the notation
{i; j} = {1; 2}); and (iii) consumer a chooses to accept both Þrms non-
exclusive oﬀers. If both Þrms changed their oﬀers to consumer a accordingly
(while leaving unchanged their oﬀers to consumer b), the outcome would still
be an equilibrium, Firm 1s proÞt would increase byMin[π1, (π1+π2+V )−
(bπ2+U2)] and Firm 2s proÞt would increase by at least (π1+π2+V )−(bπ2+
U2). This means that the equilibrium originally considered is not a PCPNE.
Third, in order to prove that there exists a PCPNE in which Firm 2 is
excluded if and only if 2bπ1 + U1 > 2π1 + 2π2 + V , we distinguish two cases.
First case: π2 + V > bπ2 + U2. Step 1. Assume that 2bπ1 + U1 > 2π1 +
2π2 + V . We show that there exists an equilibrium in which Firm 1 oﬀers
consumer a an exclusive contract together with a lump-sum payment equal
to 2π2 + V −U1, Firm 2 oﬀers consumer a a non-exclusive contract together
with a lump-sum payment equal to 2π2, and consumer a chooses to accept
Firm 1s exclusive contract. Clearly, consumer a is indiﬀerent between both
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contracts and accepting either makes him better oﬀ than accepting none.
Firm 1 cannot oﬀer less in an exclusive contract (this would cause consumer
a to accept Firm 2s non-exclusive contract and cause Firm 1s proÞt to fall
from 2bπ1 + U1 − 2π2 − V to 2π1), and Firm 2 cannot avoid being excluded
(oﬀering a more generous non-exclusive contract would cause losses, and the
inequality bπ2 +U2 < π2 + V implies that providing consumer a with a given
utility level is more expensive for Firm 2 using an exclusive than a non-
exclusive contract). This proves that the aforementioned actions deÞne an
equilibrium, which is also a PCPNE of the subgame starting in period 2
(this is because consumer a is the only agent making a decision in period
2). Finally, Firm 1s proÞt in this equilibrium, at 2bπ1 + U1 − 2π2 − V , is
greater than its level in the only non-exclusive PCPNE (where it is equal to
2π1 if bπ2 + U2 < π2 + V ). Also, this equilibrium is a PCPNE because Firm
2 would earn zero proÞt in the out-of-equilibrium event in which consumer
a would choose to accept its contract rather than Firm 1s exclusive one.
Step 2. We now prove the converse and consider a PCPNE in which Firm 2
is excluded. Two cases can arise, depending on whether one or two consumers
sign an exclusive contract with Firm 1 in equilibrium. If two consumers do,
let tke1 (k = a, b) denote the equilibrium lump-sum transfer paid by Firm 1
to consumer k. If tae1 + t
b
e1 < 2π2 + 2V − 2U1, then Firm 2 can proÞtably
avoid exclusion by oﬀering consumer k a non-exclusive contract together
with a lump-sum transfer equal to tke1 − V + U1 + ε, with ε small enough.
Thus tae1 + t
b
e1 ≥ 2π2 + 2V − 2U1, implying that Firm 1s proÞt is smaller
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than or equal to 2bπ1 − 2π2 − 2V + 2U1, which is strictly smaller than 2π1
by (3). If only one consumer, say consumer a, signs an exclusive contract
with Firm 1 in equilibrium, against a lump-sum transfer tae1, then necessarily
tae1 ≥ 2π2+V −U1, because otherwise Firm 2 could proÞtably avoid exclusion
by oﬀering consumer a a non-exclusive contract together with a lump-sum
transfer equal to tke1 − V + U1 + ε, with ε small enough. Firm 1s proÞt
is thus smaller than or equal to 2bπ1 − 2π2 − V + U1. The fact that the
equilibrium considered is a PCPNE implies that Firm 1s equilibrium proÞt is
strictly greater than Firm 1s proÞt in the only non-exclusionary PCPNE, i.e.
greater than 2π1, which implies that 2bπ1−2π2−V +U1>2π1, or equivalently
2bπ1 + U1 > 2π1 + 2π2 + V .
Second case: bπ2+U2 > π2+V. Step 1. Assume that 2bπ1+U1 > 2π1+2π2+
V . We show that there exists a PCPNE in which Firm 1 oﬀers consumer
a an exclusive contract together with a lump-sum payment equal to 2(bπ2 +
U2)− (V +U1), Firm 2 oﬀers consumer a an exclusive contract together with
a lump-sum payment equal to 2bπ2 +U2 − V , and in equilibrium consumer a
chooses to accept Firm 1s exclusive contract. In order to prove that Firm 2s
strategy is a best response, notice that in order to avoid exclusion at lowest
possible cost, Firm 2 has to oﬀer consumer a an exclusive contract (this is
because the inequality bπ2 + U2 > π2 + V implies that exclusion is jointly
optimal for the Firm 2 - consumer a pair) together with a transfer yielding
consumer a at least the same utility as it would get by accepting Firm 1s
oﬀer, i.e., a transfer equal to 2bπ2 + U2 − V . But in any subgame-perfect
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equilibrium such that consumer a signs a contract with Firm 2, consumer b
knows that it can get a utility of at least V simply by signing no contract.
Thus, the maximum proÞt Firm 2 can derive from serving consumer b is
bπ2 + U2 − V , obtained by oﬀering consumer b an exclusive contract against
a transfer of V − U2, leaving consumer b with a utility level of at least
V . Thus, given Firm 1s oﬀer, Firm 2 cannot obtain a proÞt greater than
2bπ2− (2bπ2 +U2− V ) +U2− V=0. Firm 2s strategy is thus a best response.
Conversely, Firm 1s strategy is a best response to Firm 2s, because the
transfer oﬀered to consumer a is the smallest leading consumer a not to
choose to accept Firm 2s oﬀer, and Firm 1s ensuing proÞt is greater than
the proÞt level π1 which it would earn if it oﬀered no contract at all (or no
contract which consumer a would prefer over Firm 2s oﬀer). Finally, in order
to prove that these strategies form a PCPNE, it is enough to check that Firm
1s proÞt is greater than that it would earn in the only non-exclusive PCPNE,
i.e. that 2bπ1− [2(bπ2 + U2)− (V + U1)] > 2π1−2[(bπ2+U2)− (π2+V )], which
is equivalent to the assumed inequality, i.e. 2bπ1 + U1 > 2π1 + 2π2 + V .
Step 2. Conversely, we prove that if Firm 2 is excluded in a PCPNE, then
2bπ1+U1 > 2π1+2π2+V . Two cases can arise, depending on whether one or
two consumers sign an exclusive contract with Firm 1 in equilibrium. If two
consumers do, let tke1 (k = a, b) denote the equilibrium lump-sum transfer
paid by Firm 1 to consumer k. If tae1 + t
b
e1 < 2bπ2 + 2U2 − 2U1, then Firm 2
can proÞtably avoid exclusion by oﬀering consumer k an exclusive contract
together with a lump-sum transfer equal to tke1 − U2 + U1 + ε, with ε small
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enough. Thus tae1 + t
b
e1 ≥ 2π2 + 2U2 − 2U1, implying that Firm 1s proÞt
is smaller than or equal to 2 (bπ1 − bπ2 − U2 + U1), which is strictly smaller
than 2[π1−(bπ2 + U2) + (π2 + V )] by (3). Since the right-hand side of this
inequality is equal to Firm 1s proÞt in the non-exclusive PCPNE, it follows
that there is no exclusive PCPNE in which both consumers sign an exclusive
contract. If only one consumer, say consumer a, signs an exclusive contract
with Firm 1 in equilibrium, against a lump-sum transfer tae1, then necessarily
tae1 ≥ 2(bπ2+U2)− (V +U1), because otherwise Firm 2 could proÞtably avoid
exclusion by oﬀering consumer a an exclusive contract together with a lump-
sum transfer equal to tke1−U2+U1+ ε, and consumer b an exclusive contract
together with a lump-sum transfer equal to V −U2+ ε, with ε small enough.
Firm 1s proÞt is thus smaller than or equal to 2bπ1− [2(bπ2 + U2)− (V + U1)].
The fact that the equilibrium considered is a PCPNE implies that Firm 1s
equilibrium proÞt is strictly greater than Firm 1s proÞt in the only non-
exclusionary PCPNE, i.e. greater than 2π1 − 2[(bπ2 +U2)− (π2 + V )], which
implies that 2bπ1 + U1 > 2π1 + 2π2 + V .
Proof of Proposition 7
Step 1. We prove that in any equilibrium, both Þrms earn zero proÞts.
The reason is that if Firm i earned positive proÞts in a hypothetical equilib-
rium, the other Þrm could increase its proÞt by oﬀering in stage 1 an exclusive
contract together with a breach penalty clause having the eﬀect of inducing
Firm i to relinquish some of its proÞt in Stage 3, to its own proÞt.
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Proof.
We start by showing that it is impossible in equilibrium for a consumer,
say consumer a, to make a strictly positive payment to Firm i even though
it is not served by Firm i. This could happen only if consumer a signed an
exclusive contract with Firm i together with a transfer t and a breach penalty
t0 > t, before breaching it and paying the penalty . But such an outcome
cannot be an equilibrium, because in that case Firm j could proÞtably deviate
in Stage 1 by oﬀering consumer a an exclusive contract (with no breach
possibility), together with a transfer Ui + t+ (t0 − t)/2.
Assume now that Firm i earns a strictly positive proÞt in equilibrium.
This means that there exists a consumer, say consumer a, such that in equi-
librium (with t denoting the transfer from Firm i to consumer a) either (i)
Firm i is the only Þrm serving consumer a,and t < bπi, or (ii) both Þrms serve
consumer a,and t < πi. Let U∗a denote consumer as equilibrium surplus
level. Firm j could increase its proÞt by oﬀering consumer a, in Stage 1, an
exclusive contract together with a transfer of U∗a -Uj + ε and a penalty for
breach equal to t + V − Uj + 2ε (case (i)), or t + Ui − Uj + 2ε (case (ii)),
with ε > 0 small enough. Such a contract would be accepted by consumer a
in Stage 2 (because it would provide consumer a with a surplus greater than
in the original equilibrium, by ε, and thus greater than that induced by any
other contract oﬀered to consumer a after the abovedescribed deviation).
Following this action by Firm j, and consumer as subsequent acceptance
decision, Firm i would be better oﬀ making making an oﬀer which consumer
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a wants to accept than not making such an oﬀer, because it could for exam-
ple increase its proÞt (relative to the situation in which it would not oﬀer a
contract inducing consumer a to breach Firm 2s abovementioned exclusive
contract) by oﬀering consumer a in Period 3 a non-exclusive (case (i)) or an
exclusive (case (ii)) contract together with a transfer t + 2ε. The payment
of the breach penalty by consumer a would increase Firm js proÞt by ε,
making Firm js deviation from the postulated equilibrium proÞtable.
Step 2. The following actions always form a PCPNE in which no exclusion
takes place. Both Þrms oﬀer in Stage 1 the same type of contract: Firm
i oﬀers each consumer an exclusive contract, together with (i) a transfer
πi+πj +V -Ui; (ii) a clause specifying a payment for breach equal to πj +V -
Ui (i 6= j), owed to Firm i if the consumer, having signed the contract, later
decides to drop the exclusivity requirement while still dealing with Firm i;
and (iii) a clause specifying an inÞnite payment to Firm i if the consumer
later decides not to deal with it. In Stage 2, each consumer signs one of the
two such contracts oﬀered to him (being indiﬀerent between both). In Stage
3, if Firm is Stage 1 contract was picked by a consumer, then Firm j oﬀers
this consumer a non-exclusive contract together with a transfer equal to πj,
which is accepted in Stage 4, causing the breach penalty to be paid to Firm
i, as per the contract signed in Stage 2.
Step 3. In any PCPNE, each consumers equilibrium utility level is at
least π1 + V .
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Proof. If for example consumer bs equilibrium utility level U∗b were less
than π1 + V , Firm 1 could increase its proÞt by oﬀering no contract at all
to consumer a, and by oﬀering consumer b a non-exclusive contract together
with a transfer strictly between U∗b − V and π1. After such oﬀers by Firm
1 in Stage 1, Firm 2 would serve both consumers in any subgame-perfect
equilibrium of the continuation game starting in Stage 2 (whatever its own
period 1 oﬀers), because no consumer would be bound to Firm 1 by an exclu-
sivity requirement. This being anticipated by consumer b in Stage 2 implies
that consumer b, by signing Firm 1s contract, could guarantee itself a utility
level strictly greater than U∗b (because the transfer U
∗
b − V would be supple-
mented with at least V , a consumers surplus from dealing with both Þrms).
This implies that in Stage 2, consumer b does not sign any exclusive contract
hypothetically oﬀered by Firm 2 in Stage 1 (because any exclusive contract
oﬀered by Firm 2 to consumer b in the hypothetical equilibrium yields con-
sumer b a utility level smaller than or equal to U∗b .) As a consequence, after
Firm 1s deviation, Firm 1 deals with at least consumer b, which accepts its
oﬀer. Firm 1 thus earns a strictly positive proÞt, because the transfer to
consumer b is strictly below π1. But, since Firm 1s equilibrium proÞt is zero
(as per Step 1), this deviation away from equilibrium would make Firm 1
strictly better oﬀ.
Step 4. In any PCPNE, U∗a + U
∗
b ≥ 2(π1 + π2 + V ).
Assume that this were not the case. Then Firm 2 could increase its proÞt
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by making the following oﬀers in Stage 1: oﬀer each consumer an exclusive
contract together with a transfer U∗c −U2+ε (with c = a and c = b), together
with a clause specifying a penalty π1+V −U2−ε for breaching the exclusivity
requirement, and an inÞnite penalty for not dealing with Firm 2 at all. Each
consumer would be induced to choose this contract oﬀered by Firm 2. The
reason is that, by not doing so, a consumer ends up with a utility level no
greater than U∗c (it may earn U
∗
c by signing Firm 1s equilibrium oﬀer, or at
most V < U∗c by signing no contract at all). Firm 1s optimal action in Stage
3 is thus to oﬀer a non-exclusive contract inducing both consumers to breach
Firm 2s contract, because this can be done by oﬀering a transfer equal to
(for example) π1− ε/2, leaving Firm 1 with a proÞt ε/2 per consumer. Firm
2s proÞt in any continuation subgame following its deviation away from
equilibrium would thus be equal to 2π2 + 2(π1 + V − U2 − ε)− (U∗a + U∗b −
2U2 + 2ε) = 2(π1 + π2 + V )− (U∗a + U∗b )− 4ε. Since equilibrium proÞts are
zero this implies that if U∗a +U
∗
b < 2(π1 + π2 +V ), Firm 2 could deviate and
earn a strictly positive proÞt, and thus that U∗a + U
∗
b ≥ 2(π1 + π2 + V ).
Step 5. Assumption (3) implies that total surplus (i.e. the sum of Þrms
proÞts and the surplus of both consumers) is maximized when each Þrm
serves both consumers; and that it is then equal to 2(π1 + π2 + V ). The
inequality U∗a +U
∗
b ≥ 2(π1 + π2 + V ), proved in Step 4, implies that if either
Þrm served zero or one consumer, then total surplus would be strictly less
than consumer surplus, so that at least one Þrms proÞt would be strictly
negative, which is impossible in equilibrium, since each Þrm can guarantee
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itself at least zero proÞts by deciding to oﬀer no contracts and not to deal
with any consumer. This implies that in any PCPNE, each Þrm serves both
consumers.
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